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The incentives of a plaintiﬀ in a lawsuit are aﬀected by a variety of legal rules.
One leading example is the proportion of the ﬁne imposed on the defendant that is
awarded to the plaintiﬀ. Another is the identity of the plaintiﬀ himself: private liti-
gants are motivated by the prospect of receiving damages, while government employed
plaintiﬀs (such as public prosecutors and employees of regulatory agencies) are instead
rewarded (if at all) by career advancement. The paper examines the interaction be-
tween court characteristics and plaintiﬀ incentives on the deterrence provided by con-
tracts/laws/regulations. It shows that a key determinant of the optimal level of plaintiﬀ
incentives is the extent to which a party arguing “against the facts” is able to inﬂuence
the court, relative to the party arguing with the facts. When the court is more sus-
ceptible to the inﬂuence activities of the party arguing against the facts, it is generally
optimal to restrict plaintiﬀ incentives. Implications for the use of split-award statutes,
loser-pays rules, class action lawsuits, and public enforcement are discussed. In more
general terms, the paper makes precise an avenue via which legal rules aﬀect the eﬃcacy
of a legal system.1 Introduction
A large number of legal rules impact a plaintiﬀ’s incentives to win a lawsuit. To take what
is perhaps the clearest example, a number of U.S. states have recently adopted split-award
statutes, mandating that a certain fraction of punitive damages be shared with the state.
Such rules clearly reduce a plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ from court victory. Is such a reduction good or
bad? And how does the answer depend on the properties of the court system in question?
A plaintiﬀ’s incentives matter because they aﬀect the amount of resources that he/she
is willing to devote to a lawsuit. If courts were both omniscient and pure then such
expenditures would be irrelevant matter, and the defendant’s welfare would be entirely
independent of plaintiﬀ incentives. But in most real-world courts parties can — and do
— spend resources to aﬀect their chance of success, either by paying explicit bribes (as in
many developing countries), or by employing more and/or better lawyers.
In this paper I analyze the optimal level of plaintiﬀ incentives when courts are imper-
fect. I focus in particular on the relation between the desired level of incentives, and the
underlying characteristics of the court. In particular, I identify a general property of how
inﬂuence activities aﬀect the court that determines whether it is optimal to maximize the
reward given to a successful plaintiﬀ, or whether a legal system should instead be designed
to limit plaintiﬀ incentives.
Plaintiﬀ incentives
In the simplest forms of dispute resolution, the plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ to winning a lawsuit matches
the defendant’s loss — and as such, the plaintiﬀ’s and defendant’s incentives to win the
case coincide. However, this equality of incentives is impacted by a number of legal rules.
Split-award statutes of the type mentioned above are one example. A second important
example arises when a large number of plaintiﬀs seek to bring similar lawsuits against a
common defendant. Assuming that a court’s decision in the ﬁrst few suits impacts later
court rulings, the defendants’ incentives to win each case are now greater than those of each
1individual plaintiﬀ. Equality is restored if plaintiﬀs can combine their claims, as in class
action lawsuits in the U.S.
Moreover, arguably the most fundamental determinant of plaintiﬀ incentives is his/her
actual identity. In private lawsuits the plaintiﬀ is almost always an injured party, and
if successful will receive a payment related to the punishment imposed on the defendant
(give or take the factors just described). In sharp contrast, in many instances it is instead
a government representative that acts as the plaintiﬀ. For example, a regulatory agency
such the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may ﬁle a civil lawsuit; and in any
criminal case, the role of the plaintiﬀ is occupied by a public prosecutor. Government
representatives derive very diﬀerent payoﬀs from winning a case than do private plaintiﬀs
— in place of direct monetary compensation, their award, if any, is in the form of future
career advancement. The location of the boundary between private and public law varies
signiﬁcantly across jurisdictions.
Interaction with court imperfections
In the current paper the main role of the legal system is taken to be the deterrence of certain
activities. To ﬁx ideas, consider the problem of deterring self-dealing by corporate insiders.
Corporate malfeasance of this type may expose a ﬁrm to a civil lawsuit — brought either
by shareholders, or by a regulatory body such as the SEC. The ﬁrm may also face criminal
charges. (Throughout the paper we will abuse language and refer to public prosecutors in
criminal cases as plaintiﬀs.)
The paper’s main results depend on the following pair of observations. First, because
of uncertainty about whether self-dealing has really occurred, the ﬁrm may end up in court
even absent self-dealing. Second, increasing the rewards for a successful plaintiﬀ induces
her to ﬁght the case harder regardless of whether or not malfeasance has actually occurred.
Consequently the net eﬀect on deterrence depends on whether the plaintiﬀ responds more
to an increase in rewards in the presence or in the absence of wrongdoing. This comparison
in turn hinges on when the plaintiﬀ’s attempts to inﬂuence the court have most eﬀect.
2First, in some court systems a plaintiﬀ’s expenditures may well be most inﬂuential
precisely in cases where no wrongdoing has occurred; while a defendant’s expenditures will
have most eﬀect following actual malfeasance. This sort of situation can arise when the
court, left to itself, will rule correctly. In some respects a court with these properties would
be said to function well. However, from the perspective of setting plaintiﬀ incentives it
is the marginal impact of expenditures that is important. Here, the marginal impact of
plaintiﬀ expenditures is greatest when he is arguing against the facts (i.e., no malfeasance)
— precisely because in the event of malfeasance the case is the basically the plaintiﬀ’s to
lose.
Under the circumstances just described, the plaintiﬀ’s optimal court expenditure is more
responsive to the payoﬀ to winning the case when no malfeasance has occurred. As such,
it is optimal to take steps to reduce the plaintiﬀ’s incentives — for example, by introducing
a split-award statute.
The second possibility is just the opposite of the above: a plaintiﬀ’s expenditures are
most inﬂuential when she is arguing with the facts (i.e., malfeasance has taken place). Now
the plaintiﬀ’s expenditures are most responsive to changes in her payoﬀ when she is arguing
with the facts, and it is generally desirable to set the payment awarded to the plaintiﬀ equal
to the ﬁne inﬂicted on the defendant.
The paper’s main results identify a general property of court responsiveness to inﬂuence
activities that determines which of these two cases applies.
The paper’s analysis has implications for the growing number of studies that explore the
link between legal systems and economic outcomes.1 The current paper makes precise an
avenue via which legal rules aﬀect the eﬃcacy of a legal system. In doing so, it establishes
that rules which are desirable in some court systems may be very undesirable in other court
systems. For example, class action lawsuits may play a valuable social role in deterring
certain forms of behavior in some court systems, while in other court systems allowing class
action lawsuits may actually weaken deterrence.
1For prominent examples, see North (1990) and La Porta et al (1997).
3Because the boundary of public and private law impacts the plaintiﬀ’s incentives, the
paper also has implications for questions relating to the optimal degree of regulation. In
particular, when will a regulator empowered with enforcement capabilities improve welfare?2
To the extent to which state employees are less incentivized than private litigants, the
creation of a regulator of this type serves to reduce plaintiﬀ incentives. The analysis of the
paper suggests that this is welfare improving only when courts are easily inﬂuenced by a
party arguing against the facts.
Related literature
The current paper deals with the interaction of plaintiﬀ incentives and court characteristics.
Many characteristics of the legal system aﬀect plaintiﬀ incentives. These have generally been
analyzed separately in the existing literature. Moreover, the focus of the current paper is
on the level of deterrence that a legal system provides. In this, it diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
the vast majority of studies of legal procedure that focus instead on settlement incentives
and court expenditures.3
The most obvious way in which plaintiﬀ incentives may vary is if plaintiﬀs do not
receive 100% of ﬁnes levied on defendants. Split-award statutes of the type noted above
are one example. The manner in which lawyers are compensated (contingent or ﬁxed-fee) is
another. Breaking the link between the ﬁne imposed and the damages awarded is regularly
referred to as “decoupling.” Polinsky and Che (1991) present a highly inﬂuential argument
in favor of decoupling : if the damages awarded are reduced, the plaintiﬀ spends less on
enforcement, while deterrence can be preserved by simultaneously raising the ﬁne imposed
on the defendant. In a recent paper Choi and Sanchirico (2002) qualify this result by noting
2For evidence on the eﬀect of regulators on ﬁnancial markets, see, e.g., La Porta et al (2003) and Beck
et al (2003).
3Exceptions include Spier (1994) and Bernardo et al (2000), the latter of which is discussed in more detail
below. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) include a very brief analysis in their survey of the economic analysis
of legal procedure, as well as noting that “[o]nly in few instances, however, has the analysis taken explicit
account of .... incentives for precaution created by the litigation process itself.”
4that if damages awarded are lowered then the plaintiﬀ will put less eﬀort into litigation,
thus reducing deterrence. This same eﬀect is also present in the current paper — though the
emphasis here is on the comparison between the reduction of litigation eﬀort in “justiﬁed”
and “unjustiﬁed” lawsuits.
As noted, public plaintiﬀs will generally have diﬀerent incentives to win a case than do
private litigants. Early papers to discuss the choice between public and private enforce-
ment of the law are Becker and Stigler (1974) and Landes and Posner (1979). Landes and
Posner argue that public enforcement may be preferable because it enables the probability
of prosecution to be lowered while the magnitude of the ﬁne is simultaneously raised. In
contrast, under private enforcement the probability of prosecution will generally rise if ﬁnes
are increased. Polinsky (1980) further observes that an advantage of public enforcement
is that enforcement will occur even when the expected recovery is below the cost of en-
forcement. Shavell (1993) provides an overview of the relative merits of public and private
enforcement. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) present an explanation of the emergence of gov-
ernment regulation in the United States, which shares with the current paper the idea that
courts are susceptible to inﬂuence-activities by the litigating parties. For evidence on the
career advancement actually enjoyed by successful public plaintiﬀs, see, for example, Boylan
(2003).
The English rule that the losing party in a lawsuit pays the winner’s litigation costs has
also been the object of extensive study. Much attention has focused on the eﬀect of such
laws on parties’ incentives to reach a settlement before trial — see, for example, Snyder and
Hughes (1990), who examine the impact of a temporary shift to the English rule in Florida
for medical malpractice suits. Hause (1989) uses a model that is essentially a special case
of the one presented here to study the impact of legal fee allocation on litigation expenses,
but does not directly address the eﬀect on deterrence — which is the main focus of the
current paper.
The closest antecedent to the current paper is perhaps Bernardo et al (2000), who con-
5sider the impact of “legal presumptions” on litigation expenditures and hence deterrence.4
The link between court rules, litigation expenditures and deterrence is shared with this
paper. However, the emphasis here is on the general ability of parties to inﬂuence the
court, and the link with plaintiﬀ rewards. Moreover, in the model of Bernardo et al when
presumptions are shifted to favor the plaintiﬀ this increases deterrence, with the only cost
the increase in litigation costs. In contrast, in the current paper changes in legal rules that
might seem to favor the plaintiﬀ (such as awarding him/her a greater fraction of damages)
may actually reduce deterrence. The reason is that Bernardo et al implicitly assume that
the marginal impact of increasing expenditure is always greater for the party arguing with
the facts.
2 The model
The paper studies the impact of plaintiﬀ incentives on deterrence. That is, if a contract
or law speciﬁes a penalty to be imposed when some action is taken, by how much is the
action actually deterred. To ﬁx ideas, consider the following simple incentive problem.
A principal, who we will generally refer to as Investor (I), has previously provided funds
to an agent, who we will generally refer to as Entrepreneur (E). Entrepreneur E must
now return these funds (along with a suitable interest payment). For simplicity we will
assume the funds exist, i.e., liquidity problems never prevent repayment. Entrepreneur
must choose between diverting these funds for his own use, or returning them to Investor.
There are clearly a variety of ways in which Entrepreneur can attempt to divert funds.
One possibility is to sell the ﬁrm’s assets at a heavily discounted price to a second ﬁrm that
he wholly owns.5 Another possibility, illustrated by recent accusations against former senior
Tyco executives, is for Entrepreneur to grant himself a low interest loan out of company
4For other models linking “litigation” expenditures (broadly deﬁned) and deterrence, see also Legros and
Newman (2002), Spier (1994), and Bond (2003).
5See, e.g., Zingales (1994) for evidence of the way asset transfers of this type can be used by managers
and large shareholders to expropriate resources from small shareholders.
6funds, with generous terms for forgiveness.
Notationally, let a ∈ {G[ood],B[ad]} denote the entrepreneur’s choice of whether or not
to divert, with a = G (respectively, a = B) denoting the case where he does not divert
(respectively, diverts).
Provision of incentives
There are a variety of ways for Investor to protect herself from expropriation of this sort.
If the original funds are provided as a loan, then the loan contract can be written with
covenants that restrict Entrepreneur’s behavior. If instead the funds are provided in return
for an equity stake in Entrepreneur’s business, then provisions can be placed in the corporate
charter to restrict Entrepreneur’s behavior. Both these are examples of private contractual
solutions. Investor may also be protected by laws and regulations. For example, the former
Tyco executives mentioned above have been charged with having committed Enterprise
Corruption (a criminal oﬀence), and with having violated SEC disclosure requirements.
Both private contractual solutions and public laws/regulations will be toothless unless
penalties are actually imposed by a court. We will model the court’s decision in a very
simple (though not entirely unrealistic) way: the court either ﬁnds in favor of Investor, or
in favor of Entrepreneur. If the court decides for Investor, a punishment Z is inﬂicted
upon Entrepreneur. Depending on the legal regime and the contract/law/regulation in
place, the punishment Z may be either a pecuniary ﬁne, a non-pecuniary punishment such
as imprisonment, or some combination of the two. On the other hand, if the court decides
for Entrepreneur, no penalty is imposed on either party. We defer until Section 6 the issue
of whether the loser pays the winner’s legal fees.
The plaintiﬀ’s incentives
As discussed in the introduction, this paper is concerned with the incentives of the plaintiﬀ.
Note ﬁrst that Investor is not always the plaintiﬀ. When Entrepreneur is charged with
having committed a criminal oﬀence, it is instead a representative of the state (in the U.S.,
7typically a District Attorney) who prepares the case, and who argues the case in court.
Likewise, when Entrepreneur is charged with having violated a non-criminal law/regulation,
is again regularly a representative of the state who prepares and argues the case — in the
U.S., and in the case of charges relating to diversion of funds, it is the SEC that plays
this role. In both cases, and with some abuse of language, we will refer to the state
representative as the “plaintiﬀ.”
Of course, it is also often the case that Investor is the plaintiﬀ. This is almost always
the case in charges arising out of private contracts. It is also the case when the violation
of a law/regulation gives rise to a tort action.
Regardless of the identity of the plaintiﬀ, we will denote the plaintiﬀ’s utility from
winning a case in which punishment Z is imposed on Entrepreneur by u(Z). The actual
shape of u( ) depends on a variety of factors. When the plaintiﬀ is a private individual or
corporation, and when the punishment Z is a pecuniary ﬁne that is awarded in full to the
plaintiﬀ, then it is natural to assume u(Z) = Z. If damages have been “decoupled,”with
the state taking some fraction φ of the ﬁne, then u(Z) = (1 − φ)Z. If the punishment is
non-pecuniary and the plaintiﬀ is a private citizen then (at least ignoring vengeance motives)
u(Z) ≡ 0. On the other hand, if the plaintiﬀ is a state representative then the court’s
decision may be more important than the magnitude of the penalty actually imposed: in
the extreme, we may have u(Z) ≡ u where u is some constant. We will often refer to the
case u(Z) = Z as the plaintiﬀ being fully rewarded.
Inﬂuencing the court
Plaintiﬀ incentives matter because they aﬀect the likelihood that a case is brought at all,
and if it is brought, how many resources are devoted to trying to win the case. This paper
considers the latter eﬀect. As discussed in the introduction, litigating parties can raise
their chances of prevailing in court by undertaking expenditures of various kinds. They
can hire more lawyers, and/or better lawyers. They can devote varying amounts of eﬀort to
producing evidence of varying qualities. They can also attempt to bribe court oﬃcials. The
8relative importance of these diﬀerent forms of inﬂuence activity varies greatly across legal
regimes. In many developing countries outright bribery is probably the most important.
In contrast, in the U.S. and other rich countries most observers view court corruption as
relatively rare — while at the same time there exists considerable concern about disparities
in the quantity and quality of legal representation that diﬀerent parties have access to.
Notationally, we denote the probability that the court rules for Entrepreneur as π(xE,xP;a),
where xE and xP are the inﬂuence expenditures of Entrepreneur and the plaintiﬀ respec-
tively, and a ∈ {G,B} is Entrepreneur’s action (that is, whether or not he diverted).6
Looking ahead, the paper’s main results relate general properties of this function π to the
optimal level of plaintiﬀ incentives u( ). Section 3 below gives three speciﬁc examples of
the court function π, which illustrate how these properties may arise. Throughout, we
assume that the probability π (respectively, 1 − π) that the court rules for Entrepreneur
(respectively, the plaintiﬀ) is an increasing and strictly concave function of Entrepreneur
expenditure xE (respectively, the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure xP). We will assume moreover
that π is twice-diﬀerentiable in both xE and xP, so that πE > 0, πEE ≤ 0, πP < 0, πPP ≥ 0.
We assume throughout that the court treats Entrepreneur and the plaintiﬀ symmet-
rically. More speciﬁcally, the probability that Entrepreneur wins the case if the legal
expenditures are (xE,xP) = (X,X′) and Entrepreneur has behaved is the same as the
probability that the plaintiﬀ wins the case if the legal expenditures are (xE,xP) = (X′,X)
and Entrepreneur diverted, at least up to an additive constant. That is, there exists a
constant κ such that for all xE,xP,
π(xE,xP;G) = 1 − π(xP,xE;B) + κ (SYM)
Note that this assumption does not rule out the possibility that the court systematically
favors one party over the other, since it says nothing about the level of π — which is
determined by the constant κ.
6This formulation includes as a special case the inﬂuence game analyzed by Katz (1988), as will be made
clear in Section 3 below. The current paper’s main focus is on the determinants of deterrence; in contrast,
Katz is concerned primarily with court expenditures themselves.
9Timing
Events take place according to the following timing:
1. A contract/law/regulation is speciﬁed.
2. Investor supplies ﬁnancing to Entrepreneur.
3. Entrepreneur decides whether or not to divert
4. Case proceeds to court:
(a) The plaintiﬀ and Entrepreneur decide how many resources to devote to inﬂuence
the court.
(b) Court either rules for Entrepreneur, in which case he is not punished, or against
Entrepreneur, in which case he is punished by the amount Z.
Remark 1: In order to focus on the eﬀects related to choices of legal expenditures, we are
assuming for now that regardless of Entrepreneur’s action the case proceeds to court. In
practice, there are at least a two reasons why Entrepreneur may end up in court when he
has not diverted. First, the plaintiﬀ may believe Entrepreneur has diverted when he has in
fact behaved honestly. Second, the plaintiﬀ may know Entrepreneur has not diverted, but
the possibility of prevailing at trial makes it worth ﬁling suit. For example, if there are no
costs associated with actually ﬁling a suit then the plaintiﬀ will always ﬁle, at least provided
she derives positive utility from success in court and there is a non-zero probability that the
court will wrongly decide the case in her favor. We will brieﬂy discuss the case of positive
ﬁling costs in Section 6.
Remark 2: At least for now we ignore the possibility of out-of-court settlement. We return
to this issue in Section 6.
10Equilibrium expenditures
Once the case arrives in court, the plaintiﬀ and Entrepreneur simultaneously choose how
much to spend in court. Taking the plaintiﬀ’s choice of xP as given, Entrepreneur chooses
xE to maximize his expected payoﬀ,
−(1 − π (xE,xP;a))Z − xE.
Similarly the plaintiﬀ takes xE as given and chooses xP to maximize her expected payoﬀ,
(1 − π(xE,xP;a))u(Z) − xP
Deﬁne xEa (xP) and xPa (xE) to be Entrepreneur’s best response to the plaintiﬀ’s choice of
expenditure xP, and the plaintiﬀ’s best response to Entrepreneur’s choice of expenditure
xE, respectively. The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) for xEa (xP) and xPa (xE) are
πE (xEa (xP),xP;a) ≤
1
Z
, with equality if xEa (xP) > 0 (1)
−πP (xE,xPa (xE);a) ≤
1
u(Z)
, with equality if xPa (xE) > 0 (2)
Note that since π is strictly concave in xE and convex in xP, each party has a unique best
response to the other’s choice of expenditure, and so xEa (xP) and xPa (xE) are well-deﬁned.
For future reference, note moreover that both best response functions are continuous.7
Lemma 1. (Equilibrium existence and uniqueness)
For both a = G,B, an equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof of Lemma 1: See appendix.




7This is easily shown. For example, for Entrepreneur’s best response function this follows from the fact
that πE is strictly decreasing in xE, and is continuous in xP.
11Deterrence
The deterrence provided by the contract/law/regulation against diversion is just the diﬀer-
ence in the expected utility of Entrepreneur when he has diverted, and when he has acted
honestly. The deterrence provided against Entrepreneur diverting is thus
ζ (Z;u) = Z (π(x∗
EG,x∗





That is, deterrence depends both on the diﬀerence in Entrepreneur’s equilibrium probabil-
ities of prevailing in court after he behaves and diverts, and also on the diﬀerence in his
legal expenditures between these two instances.
3 Three examples of π
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we consider three possible speciﬁcations of the court
function π.
A bribery game
Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation is intended to capture the basic dynamics of outright court corruption.
In this case, the expenditures xE and xP of the two parties are simply bribes paid to the
judge.
How does the judge decide who to rule for? If he is inﬂuenced by bribe payments, he
runs the risk that he will be discovered and punished. The risk of discovery and punishment
depends on how the case would appear to a subsequent investigation. We assume that the
information available to a subsequent investigation is summarized by a random variable θ,
where positive values of θ correspond to a case that an investigation would deem should
have been decided in favor of Entrepreneur. We denote the density function for θ after
action a by fa, and make the mild assumptions that the distribution is unimodal, and that
the density is increasing to the left of the modal point and decreasing to the right.
12The judge risks punishment if he decides a case for the plaintiﬀ when θ > 0, or for
Entrepreneur when θ < 0. Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that the probability of
detection, and the punishment itself, are both increasing in |θ|. Given this, we normalize
the signal θ so that the expected punishment faced by the judge is |θ|.
Although θ is not perfectly informative, we assume that its modal point is above 0 when
Entrepreneur has behaved, and below 0 when he has diverted. So loosely speaking, higher
values of θ are more likely when Entrepreneur behaves.
What happens if Entrepreneur pays a bribe and yet the judge rules for the plaintiﬀ?
Denote by y (xE,θ) the pain that disappointed Entrepreneur inﬂicts on the judge — ei-
ther by reporting the judge to the authorities, or by reducing the judge’s future bribe
income by complaining to acquaintances about the judges unreliability, or even direct pri-
vate vengeance. We assume Entrepreneur will inﬂict more pain when he has paid a higher
bribe and yet still lost the case. Symmetrically, let y (xP,−θ) denote the pain inﬂicted
by a disappointed plaintiﬀ. Note that we are allowing y to depend on the signal θ — for
example, Entrepreneur may be able to punish a judge more for declining a bribe when θ is
more in his favor.8
We assume that the judge observes θ while Entrepreneur and the plaintiﬀ do not. So
the judge will rule for Entrepreneur when θ > 0 if and only if
y (xP,−θ) < y (xE,θ) + θ,
and will rule for Entrepreneur when θ < 0 if and only if
y (xP,−θ) − θ < y (xE,θ).
Combining, the judge rules for Entrepreneur if and only if
θ > y (xP,−θ) − y (xE,θ).
8We are implicitly assuming here that the judge always ﬁnds is worthwhile to accept the bribe. Provided
Eθ [y|a] is less than x, this is indeed the case.
13In other words, the judge rules for Entrepreneur whenever the signal θ is above some critical
cutoﬀ level ¯ θ(xE,xP).9 The court function π is thus10
π(xE,xP;a) = Pr
 






Evidence presentation to a partially informed judge
The same speciﬁcation can also be used to model evidence presentation to an honest but
partially informed judge. Let θ denote the evidence collected by a judge. Parties can
spend resources to produce further evidence. An expenditure xE by Entrepreneur produces
evidence y (xE,θ), while an expenditure of xP by the plaintiﬀ produces evidence y (xP,−θ).
Note that we allow for the possibility of interdependence between the evidence produced
by a party, and the evidence directly observed by the judge.
Evidence presentation to a passive judge
Our third example of the court function π again stems from interpreting xE and xP as
expenditures on evidence production. However, we depart from the previous example in
interpreting θ as a random factor that aﬀects the court’s ruling, where the distribution of
these random factors is completely unrelated to the underlying action a ∈ {G,B}. For
example, θ might represent the biases of a passive judge who simply listens to evidence
presented by the two parties. More formally, we assume that the court’s signal θ is identically
distributed with density f after both actions a = G,B. As before, we assume that the
distribution of f is unimodal; and that the density is increasing to the left of the modal
point and decreasing to the right.
9We are assuming that ∂ (y (xP,−θ) − y (xE,θ))/∂θ < 1. This condition is certainly satisﬁed if y (x,θ)
is weakly increasing in θ, i.e., a Entrepreneur can inﬂict more pain on the judge when the judge’s own signal
θ is more pro-Entrepreneur.












with α suﬃciently large.
14Returning to evidence production, in this example we assume that the underlying action
a directly impacts the amount of evidence a party produces. So Entrepreneur’s expendi-
ture xE produces evidence yE (xE;a), and the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure xP produces evidence
yP (xP;a).11 We make the natural assumptions that if the two parties spend the same
amount, the party arguing with the facts produces more evidence than the party arguing
against the facts; and that if the two parties produce the same amount of evidence, the
party arguing with the facts has a lower marginal cost of producing extra evidence. That
is,
yE (x;G) > yP (x;G) and yE (x;B) < yP (x;B) for all x (4)
yE (xE;G) = yP (xP;G) =⇒ y′
E (xE;G) ≥ y′
P (xP;G) (5)
yE (xE;B) = yP (xP;B) =⇒ y′
E (xE;B) ≤ y′
P (xP;B). (6)
Finally, we assume that both yE and yP are concave functions.
In this example, the court function π is simply
π(xE,xP;a) = Pr(θ > yP (xP;a) − yE (xE;a)). (7)
For use below, deﬁne Q(∆y) ≡ Pr(θ > −∆y); that is, Q(∆y) is the probability that the
court rules for Entrepreneur when Entrepreneur has produced an amount ∆y more evidence.
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(8)




F, with at least one strict. This parameterization allows for
both a diﬀerence in the baseline level of evidence produced when parties spend nothing,
and for a diﬀerence in the marginal evidence produced by further expenditures.12
11This specialization of the model is essentially the same as that analyzed in Katz (1988). As noted
previously, the papers diﬀer in that the current paper’s main focus is on the determinants of deterrence; in
contrast, Katz is concerned primarily with court expenditures themselves.
12The court function π is concave in xE and convex in xP provided the curvature of the function Q, as
154 Optimal plaintiﬀ incentives
In this section we characterize what properties the court function π must possess for full
plaintiﬀ incentives to be (locally) optimal. By full plaintiﬀ incentives, we mean that the
utility punishment inﬂicted on Entrepreneur when he loses the case matches the utility gain
enjoyed by the plaintiﬀ, i.e., u(Z) = Z.
The eﬀect of changing u(Z) on equilibrium expenditures
Plaintiﬀ incentives matter because they inﬂuence the resources expended in court by the
plaintiﬀ, which in turn aﬀect Entrepreneur’s choice of court expenditures, his probability of
success in court, and ultimately the deterrence ζ provided. Given this, we start by analyzing
how a small reduction in plaintiﬀ incentives u(Z) aﬀects the equilibrium expenditures of
the two parties.
Lowering plaintiﬀ incentives reduces the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure xPa (xE) for any given
Entrepreneur expenditure xE, while leaving Entrepreneur’s own best response function
unchanged. The eﬀect on equilibrium expenditures depends on the shape of the best










if xPa (xE) > 0. (9)
In the case that the Entrepreneur’s (respectively, the plaintiﬀ’s) FOC is not at equality,
then xEa (xP) = x′
Ea (xP) = 0 (respectively, xPa (xE) = x′
Pa (xE) = 0). Observe that the
only point at which a party’s best response function may fail to be diﬀerentiable is when
the best response function is equal to zero, and the FOC holds at equality. But even here
both one-sided derivatives exist.
Consider a small reduction in the plaintiﬀ reward to winning a case, i.e., u(Z) to u(Z)−
ε. As just noted, the plaintiﬀ’s best response function is lowered at all points; diﬀerentiating
deﬁned by |Q
′′/Q
′|, is always less than 1/γT. This condition is satisﬁed if θ is distributed logistically, i.e.,













































































Figure 1: The eﬀect of reducing u(Z) by ε on the plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium expenditure











The new equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the plaintiﬀ’s new best response
function and Entrepreneur’s best response function, which is of course unchanged by the
change in plaintiﬀ incentives. Let ˆ x∗
Pa denote the plaintiﬀ’s new equilibrium expenditure.
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Stated more formally, and taking care of cases where one or more parties chooses a zero
expenditure and so the FOC do not hold at equality, we have:
Lemma 2. (Change in plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium choice of legal expenditure)
The left-hand side derivative of x∗






















(If xEa ( ) is not diﬀerentiable at x∗
Pa, then x′
Ea (x∗
Pa) is understood to denote the left-hand
side derivative.)
Proof of Lemma 2: The main idea of the proof is given in the text above. The formal
proof is given in the appendix.
Eﬀect of changing u(Z) on deterrence
Now we know how a small reduction in plaintiﬀ rewards aﬀects equilibrium expenditures,
we are in a position to assess the impact on deterrence. First, taking the plaintiﬀ’s choice
of expenditure xP as given, Entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ is
V (xP;a) ≡ max
xE
−(1 − π(xE,xP;a))Z − xE (10)
The deterrence provided by Z is simply
ζ (Z;u) = V (x∗
PG;G) − V (x∗
PB;B)
By the envelope theorem,13
V ′ (xP;a) = πP (xEa (xP),xP;a)Z (11)
13The application of the envelope theorem is immediate when xEa (xP) > 0. If xEa (xP) = 0 over some
open neighborhood around xP, then clearly V
′ (xP;a) = πP (0,xP;a)Z = πP (xEa (xP),xP;a)Z. Thus
the only potential diﬃculty arises at a point xP such that xEa (·) = 0 to one side, but xEa (·) > 0 to the
other. But in this case the limits of the derivative from either side both equal πP (0,xP;a)Z, and so V is
indeed diﬀerentiable at this point, with its derivative equal to πP (xEa (xP),xP;a)Z.
18If the plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium expenditure is x∗
Pa > 0, then from the FOC πP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;a) =
−1/u(Z). On the other hand, if x∗
Pa = 0 then from Lemma 2, ∂x∗
Pa/∂u− = 0. Combined,
these statements imply:
Lemma 3. (Change in deterrence)















In words, Lemma 3 says that a reduction in plaintiﬀ rewards u(Z) will reduce deterrence
if and only if it generates a bigger reduction in plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium legal expenditures after
Entrepreneur has diverted than behaved.
A necessary condition for full plaintiﬀ incentives to be optimal
Between them, Lemmas 2 and 3 are enough to determine whether a change in plaintiﬀ incen-
tives will lead to a punishment Z providing more or less deterrence against entrepreneurial
misbehavior. We turn now to the interpretation of these conditions. In this section we
focus on the speciﬁc question of whether it is optimal to give the plaintiﬀ full incentives,
i.e., u(Z) = Z.
Recall that we have assumed that the court treats Entrepreneur and the plaintiﬀ sym-
metrically, in the sense that the marginal impact of Entrepreneur’s expenditure after he
behaves and the plaintiﬀ spends X matches the marginal impact of the plaintiﬀ’s expen-
diture after Entrepreneur diverts and spends X. (Again, this assumption does not rule
the possibility that the court systematically favors one party over the other, since it says
nothing about the level of π.) An immediate consequence of this assumption is that if the
plaintiﬀ is fully rewarded (u(Z) = Z), the game between Entrepreneur and the plaintiﬀ
after Entrepreneur has behaved is exactly the same as that between the plaintiﬀ and En-
trepreneur after Entrepreneur has diverted, with the two parties eﬀectively swapping roles.







From Lemma 2, it is clear that a key determinant of the eﬀect of changing plaintiﬀ incen-





Ea)| after a = G,B. Symmetry implies that the product of the reaction










This observation, together with Lemmas 2 and 3, gives:
Proposition 1. (When are full plaintiﬀ rewards optimal?)









Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose to the contrary that neither condition holds. If
x∗
EG > 0, then from (12) and Lemma 2 ∂x∗
PG/∂u− > ∂x∗
PB/∂u−. That is, a reduction
14Symmetry of the court function π further implies that, for any xP and xE,
πPE (xE,xP;G) = −πPE (xP,xE;B)
πPP (xE,xP;G) = −πEE (xP,xE;B)
πEE (xE,xP;G) = −πPP (xP,xE;B).










































































20in plaintiﬀ rewards from u(Z) will decrease equilibrium plaintiﬀ expenditures by more
after Entrepreneur has behaved than after he has diverted. Consequently, by Lemma 3
deterrence is increased.
On the other hand, if x∗
EG = 0 then by symmetry the plaintiﬀ spends nothing after
Entrepreneur has diverted, x∗
PB = 0. So by Lemma 2, decreasing plaintiﬀ rewards from
u(Z) will decrease equilibrium plaintiﬀ expenditures after Entrepreneur has behaved, while
in equilibrium the plaintiﬀ still spends nothing after Entrepreneur has stolen. Again, by
Lemma 3 deterrence is increased. QED
Concentrating on the case in which the plaintiﬀ spends a positive amount even when
Entrepreneur has behaved, Proposition 1 says that it is only optimal to maximize the
rewards of the plaintiﬀ to winning a case when the speed at which the marginal impact
of the plaintiﬀ’s expenditures is diminishing is greater when the plaintiﬀ faces an innocent
Entrepreneur, that is, when the plaintiﬀ is arguing against the facts.
Finally, a further application of symmetry implies
πPP (x∗
EB,x∗
PB;B) = −πEE (x∗
EG,x∗
PG;G)
Proposition 1 can then be restated as:
Corollary 1. (When are full plaintiﬀ rewards optimal?)
Suppose x∗




PG;G)| ≥ |πEE (x∗
EG,x∗
PG;G)|
or, equivalently, only if
πPP (x∗
EG,x∗
PG;G) + πEE (x∗
EG,x∗
PG;G) ≥ 0 (14)
As Corollary 1 makes clear, the condition for full plaintiﬀ incentives to be optimal can
alternatively be stated in terms of the comparative speed with which the marginal impact
of expenditures by the two parties are diminishing. That is, full plaintiﬀ rewards are only
optimal if the marginal impact of expenditures of the party arguing with the facts diminishes
less quickly than the marginal impact of expenditures of the party arguing against the facts.
21Application to the ﬁrst two examples of Section 3
The ﬁrst two examples — i.e., the bribery game, and evidence presentation to a partially
informed judge — are formally equivalent and we consider them together.
From (3), the marginal eﬀects of expenditures on the probability of Entrepreneur win-
ning in court are
πE (xE,xP) = −fa
 ¯ θ(xE,xP)
 ¯ θE (xE,xP) and πP (xE,xP) = −fa
 ¯ θ
 ¯ θP (xE,xP).
Here, ¯ θE (xE,xP) and ¯ θP (xE,xP) are the marginal changes in the critical level of the judge’s
evidence ¯ θ to expenditure changes, and are themselves given by


























It is straightforward to see that in equilibrium the two parties spend the same amount, and
so ¯ θ (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa) = 0. Proposition 1 is easiest to apply here in the form of Corollary 1; for
this, we need to evaluate the second derivatives of the court function π. These are given
by















Because the two parties spend the same amount in equilibrium,
 




























Recall that the modal realization of θ is greater than 0 when Entrepreneur has behaved;
so by our assumptions on the density of θ, f′
G (0) > 0. So by Corollary 1, full plaintiﬀ
rewards are suboptimal in the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations of π discussed in Section 3. That is,
15The appendix includes a formal demonstration of this claim.
22a reduction in plaintiﬀ incentives would serve to increase deterrence against Entrepreneur
diverting.
Intuitively, what accounts for the fact that |πEE| > |πPP| at the equilibrium expendi-
tures after Entrepreneur has behaved? At equilibrium Entrepreneur is trying to reduce the
probability that the judge rules against him. The marginal beneﬁt from paying an extra
bribe stems from winning the case when θ is slightly less than the existing critical value
¯ θ. But the probability of such signals is low. In contrast, the plaintiﬀ is trying to reduce
the chance that Entrepreneur wins the case. Paying a slightly larger bribe is advantageous
because it means she will win for realizations of θ just above ¯ θ — and since these signals
are closer to the mode, the probability of such realizations is slightly higher.
Application to the third example of Section 3
We turn now to the speciﬁcation of π that can be interpreted as evidence presentation to a
passive judge. Substituting in the expression (7) for the court function, condition (14) of
Corollary 1 is
Q′′ (yE (x∗






















   











   
   
−
 
   











   
   
 
≥ 0 (17)
Now, Entrepreneur’s equilibrium evidence production after he has behaved must exceed
that of the plaintiﬀ, i.e.,
yE (x∗
EG;G) ≥ yP (x∗
PG;G) (18)
For suppose otherwise, i.e., yE (x∗
EG;G) < yP (x∗
PG;G). Certainly x∗
PG  = 0 and so the




PG;G). We can always ﬁnd a
level of expenditure by Entrepreneur, xE > x∗
EG, such that his evidence production matches
that of the plaintiﬀ, yE (xE;G) = yP (x∗
PG;G). But then y′





PG;G), which contradicts condition (5).
23Given that Entrepreneur is producing more evidence than the plaintiﬀ, the function Q
is concave at the equilibrium evidence levels. We have thus established:
Corollary 2. (A necessary condition for the optimality of full plaintiﬀ rewards
in the “passive judge” case)
In the “passive judge” example, full plaintiﬀ rewards u(Z) = Z are optimal only if either
after x∗
PG = 0, or if after Entrepreneur behaves the curvature of Entrepreneur’s evidence
production function yE, as measured by the ratio of the second derivative to the ﬁrst, is
less than the curvature of the plaintiﬀ’s evidence production function yP (both evaluated at
equilibrium expenditure levels). That is, u(Z) = Z is optimal only if
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(19)
In contrast to the other two examples of Section 3, full plaintiﬀ incentives may be optimal
here. To see when condition (17) will and will not hold, consider the parametrization of the




2 /γT and y′′
P (xP;G) = −(y′
P (xP;G))
2 /γF. Moreover, when the plaintiﬀ is
fully rewarded, the marginal evidence produced by further expenditures must be equal for




PG;G). Substituting into condition
(17), full plaintiﬀ rewards u(Z) = Z are optimal only if
−2
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As is clear from condition (20), if the evidence production functions diﬀer only in the




F, with which the two parties are endowed then full
plaintiﬀ rewards can never be strictly optimal. It does not matter how big an advantage
the party arguing with the facts is endowed with.
On the other hand, if the cost of evidence production parameters γT and γF diﬀer
suﬃciently, then (20) will be satisﬁed. In particular, whenever γF satisﬁes 1/γF > 1/γT +
2max|Q′′/Q′| then full plaintiﬀ rewards can be optimal. This condition is met whenever
the party arguing against the facts has costs of evidence production which increase much











Plaintiff expenditures after a=G (solid line) and a=B (dashed line)






Entrepreneur welfare after a=G (solid line) and a=B (dashed line)
Figure 2: Deterrence as function of plaintiﬀ rewards (Z)/Z: γT = 1/2, γF = 1/4, Q(y) =
ex/(1 + ex) and Z = 30.
more quickly than those of the party arguing against the facts. Figure 2 graphically displays
an example.
Well-functioning courts?
The results of this section indicate that full plaintiﬀ rewards are suboptimal for deterrence if
the expenditures of the party arguing with the facts are subject to a faster rate of diminishing
returns than are the expenditures of the party arguing against the facts. In many ways
this is a property that might be expected to hold in courts that function badly, but not in
25those that function well.
One way to think about this characterization of well-functioning courts more formally is
as follows. Consider what happens if both parties’ increase their equilibrium expenditures
by $1. In a well-functioning court we would expect such an increase in expenditures to
raise the probability of the court ruling correctly, i.e., for Entrepreneur after a = G and for
the plaintiﬀ after a = B. In a poorly functioning court we would expect just the opposite.
For small increases ε in both parties’ expenditures, the change in the probability that
the court rules for Entrepreneur is given by
ε(πE (x∗
Ea,x∗








Pa;a) + πPP (x∗
Ea,x∗






Since at the equilibrium expenditures πE (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;a) = 1/Z = −πP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;a), we can
see that when the Entrepreneur has behaved, he is more likely to prevail in court after the
expenditure change if and only if
πEE (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;G) + πPP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;G) + 2πPE (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;G) > 0. (21)
Condition (21) diﬀers from condition (14) of Corollary 1 only in that it includes the term
πEP, which measures how a change in the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure xP aﬀects the marginal
impact of Entrepreneur’s expenditures xE. In general, πEP could be either positive or
negative. However, one might expect that after the Entrepreneur has diverted a high
level of plaintiﬀ expenditures will prove decisive, and so πE will grow small. Likewise,
after Entrepreneur has behaved, we would expect |πP| to become small when Entrepreneur
expends a large amount. More formally, we will say that the court function π satisﬁes
property (CE) if there exist cutoﬀ levels ¯ xE (xP) and ¯ xP (xE) satisfying
πEP (xE,xP;G) > 0 if xE ≥ ¯ xE (xP)
πEP (xE,xP;B) < 0 if xP ≥ ¯ xP (xE). (CE)
Combining these observations:
26Corollary 3. (Full plaintiﬀ rewards suboptimal in poorly functioning courts)
Suppose x∗
PG > 0 when u(Z) = Z, and πEP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;G) > 0 (i.e., property (CE) holds
at (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa) after a = G.) Then full plaintiﬀ rewards are suboptimal if a small increase in
both parties expenditures after Entrepreneur has behaved decreases the probability that the
court rules for Entrepreneur.
Moreover, in the “passive judge” example of Section 3 we can show that the requirement
πEP ≥ 0 at the equilibrium expenditures (x∗
EG,x∗
PG) is always satisﬁed. To see this, observe
that under this speciﬁcation
πEP (xE,xP;a) = −y′
P (xP;a)y′
E (xE;a)Q′′ (yE (xE;a) − yP (xP;a))
As noted previously, Entrepreneur’s equilibrium production of evidence after he has behaved
exceeds that of the plaintiﬀ, yE (x∗
EG;G) ≥ yP (x∗
PG;G). So at equilibrium evidence levels
Q is concave, and so πEP (x∗
EG,x∗
PG;G) ≥ 0, as claimed.
5 Are truth and legal expenditures complements or substi-
tutes?
In the previous section we characterized when full plaintiﬀ rewards are locally optimal.
The key determinant is the comparative rate at which the marginal impact of expenditures
diminish for the two parties, at the equilibrium expenditures. This is essentially a local
property of the court function π. In contrast, in this section we derive a property of π
that determines whether or not a fully reward plaintiﬀ is better or worse than a completely
unincentivized plaintiﬀ.
As motivation, consider a case in which πPP (xE,xP;B) > πPP (xE,xP;G), not just
locally at equilibrium expenditures, as in Proposition 1, but instead globally for all ex-
penditure choices xE and xP. Under the additional condition that for any Entrepreneur
expenditure xE, the ﬁrst dollar spent by the plaintiﬀ has the same eﬀect after diversion
and non-diversion, i.e., πP (xE,0;G) = πP (xE,0;B), then it follows that an extra dollar of
27expenditure by the plaintiﬀ is always worth less after Entrepreneur has diverted than after
he has behaved, i.e.,
|πP (xE,xP;B)| < |πP (xE,xP;G)| for all xE,xP. (SUB)
By symmetry, an equivalent statement of inequality (SUB) is that the marginal impact of
Entrepreneur expenditures is greater after Entrepreneur has diverted:
πE (xE,xP;G) < πE (xE,xP;B) for all xE,xP.
In essence, condition (SUB) says that the truth (as in whether the plaintiﬀ is arguing
for or against the facts) and expenditures are substitutes. It is, loosely speaking, the
global analogue of the local condition of Proposition 1. Condition (SUB) holds in some
parameterizations of the “passive judge’ example of Section 3;16 on the other hand, it is not
satisﬁed by the ﬁrst two examples of Section 3.
Parallel to condition (SUB), we can deﬁne the global analogue of πPP ( , ;B) < πPP ( , ;G):
|πP (xE,xP;B)| > |πP (xE,xP;G)| for all xE,xP. (COMP)
Condition (COMP) says that the truth and expenditures are complements; it can be equiv-
alently stated as
πE (xE,xP;G) > πE (xE,xP;B) for all xE,xP.
The main result of this section is that when the truth and expenditures are substitutes,
then full plaintiﬀ rewards u(Z) = Z are not just locally suboptimal — they are worse even
than the extreme of giving a plaintiﬀ no incentive to win a case (u(Z) = 0). Conversely,
when the truth and expenditures are complements, a fully incentivized plaintiﬀ is better
than a completely unincentivized plaintiﬀ.
The basic reasoning underlying this result is straightforward. First, when the plaintiﬀ
is entirely unrewarded, he clearly spends nothing to try to win the case, and so xP = 0.
16One example is when the evidence production functions are as in (8), with γF = γT, and the noise term
θ is distributed logistically. The appendix includes a proof.
28The deterrence provided in this case can be written
ζ (Z;u ≡ 0) = V (0;G) − V (0;B).
On the other hand, if the plaintiﬀ is fully rewarded he will typically spend a positive amount
xP > 0. The key question is how the gap between Entrepreneur’s utility when he behaves
and diverts changes as the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure xP changes.
Assume for now that property (CE) holds for all relevant expenditure levels xE and xP
— we discuss this in more detail below. By the envelope theorem (see equation (11)),
∂
∂xP
(V (xP;G) − V (xP;B)) = Z (πP (xEG(xP),xP;G) − πP (xEB (xP),xP;B)).
First, consider the case in which truth and expenditures are substitutes, i.e., (SUB)
holds. Holding the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure constant Entrepreneur spends less after he has
behaved, xEG(xP) ≤ xEB (xP). Since we are assuming that πPE (xE,xP;G) > 0 holds for
xP and xE ≥ xEG (xP), then
∂
∂xP
(V (xP;G) − V (xP;B)) ≤ Z (πP (xEB (xP),xP;G) − πP (xEB (xP),xP;B)).
Condition (SUB) then implies the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure has less eﬀect after the En-
trepreneur has diverted, i.e., |πP (xEB (xP),xP;B)| < |πP (xEB (xP),xP;G)|, and so
∂
∂xP
(V (xP;G) − V (xP;B)) < 0
That is, as the plaintiﬀ’s expenditures increase the deterrence provided by the punishment
Z actually decreases (see Figure 3).
Conversely, consider the case in which truth and expenditures are complements, i.e.,
(COMP) holds. Holding the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure constant Entrepreneur now expends less
after he has diverted, xEG(xP) ≥ xEB (xP). Since we are assuming πPE (xE,xP;G) > 0
holds for xP and xE ≥ xEB (xP), then
∂
∂xP




XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X V (xP;G)











PG;G) − V (x∗
PB;B) V (0;G) − V (0;B)
Figure 3: Eﬀect of xP on deterrence when (SUB) holds.
Condition (COMP) then implies then implies the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure has more eﬀect




(V (xP;G) − V (xP;B)) > 0
That is, as the plaintiﬀ’s expenditures increase the deterrence provided also increases (see
Figure 4).
Although suggestive, the above observations do not quite imply that a fully incentivized
plaintiﬀ generates less deterrence when (SUB) holds and more when (COMP) holds. The
reason is that an incentivized plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium expenditures will generally be diﬀerent
after Entrepreneur behaves and diverts. To make complete the analysis, we need to know
something about the comparative magnitude of these equilibrium expenditures. The fol-
lowing result provides just this comparison, and is based on the same properties of (SUB)
or (COMP), along with the assumption that πEP ( , ;G) > 0 over a large enough set of
expenditures.
Lemma 4. (Comparison of plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium expenditures)
If (SUB) holds and (CE) holds for all xP ≤ x∗
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of xP on deterrence when (COMP) holds.
(COMP) holds and (CE) holds for all xP ≤ x∗
PG and xE ≥ xEB (xP), then x∗
PB ≥ x∗
PG.
Proof of Lemma 4: See appendix.
Lemma 4 tells us that when (SUB) holds, the deterrence provided by punishment Z
must be at most V (x∗
PB;G) − V (x∗
PB;B) (see Figure 3). Likewise, when (COMP) holds
the deterrence provided by punishment Z must be at least V (x∗
PG;G) − V (x∗
PG;B)(see
Figure 4). Thus we have established:
Proposition 2. (Are truth and expenditure in court complements or substitutes?)
(A) Suppose that truth and expenditures are substitutes ((SUB) holds) and that πEP (xE,xP;G) >
0 for all xP ≤ x∗
PG and xE ≥ xEG (xP). Then a fully rewarded plaintiﬀ generates less de-
terrence than a completely unincentivized plaintiﬀ.
(B) Suppose that truth and expenditures are complements ((COMP) holds) and that πEP (xE,xP;G) >
0 for all xP ≤ x∗
PG and xE ≥ xEB (xP). Then a fully rewarded plaintiﬀ generates more
deterrence than a completely unincentivized plaintiﬀ.
Proposition 2 is stated conditional on πEP ( , ;G) being positive over a large range of
expenditure pairs (xE,xP). We would obviously like to know whether this condition is
31ever met. In the “passive judge” example of Section 3, πEP (xE,xP;G) is positive precisely
when Entrepreneur produces more evidence than the plaintiﬀ, i.e., yE (xE;G) ≥ yP (xP;G).
We have already observed that this condition is satisﬁed at the equilibrium expenditures
x∗
EG and x∗
PG (see equation (18)). In fact, we can show that this same property holds for
all plaintiﬀ expenditures below the equilibrium level, xP ≤ x∗
PG:
Lemma 5. (Property (CE) in the “passive judge” example)
In the “passive judge” example of Section 3, whenever the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure is below
the equilibrium level, xP ≤ x∗
PG, Entrepreneur responds by spending enough to produce more
evidence, yE (xEG (xP);G) ≥ yP (xP;G). Thus πEP (xE,xP;G) ≥ 0 for all xP ≤ x∗
PG and
xE ≥ xEG(xP).
Proof of Lemma 5: See appendix.
Thus we have:
Corollary 4. (Unincentivized plaintiﬀ better)
If truth and expenditures are substitutes ((SUB) holds) in the “passive judge” example of
Section 3, then a fully rewarded plaintiﬀ generates less deterrence than a completely unin-
centivized plaintiﬀ.
6 Robustness
Raising the punishment Z
Thus far we have considered the deterrence provided against Entrepreneur diverting under
diﬀerent rewards for the plaintiﬀ. We have shown that in many cases fully incentivizing
the plaintiﬀ (by granting him receipt of the full punishment inﬂicted on Entrepreneur) is
suboptimal. One might ask, however, whether it would instead be possible to achieve the
desired deterrence level simply by increasing the punishment inﬂicted Z.
In practice, raising the punishment Z may not be possible. If Z is a ﬁne, then it
is clearly bounded above by Entrepreneur’s wealth. “Fairness” considerations might also
32prevent Z from being too high. Moreover, and perhaps less obviously, raising Z might
not actually lead to greater deterrence at all. Loosely speaking, the reason is that as Z is
raised the two litigating parties will respond by increasing their legal expenditures. In the
extreme, the two parties may ﬁght themselves to a draw in court, and the probability that
Entrepreneur wins the case may be exactly the same after he behaves and diverts. In this
case, the size of the actual punishment Z has no eﬀect on deterrence at all.
More formally, to make this point as starkly as possible consider a variant of the “passive
judge” example of Section 3 in which
yE (x;G) = yP (x;B) = c−1 (x + c0)
yE (x;B) = yP (x;G) = c−1 (x) (22)
for some convex function c( ) and c0 > 0. These evidence functions are a generalized
version of those given in (8) with γT = γF: c(y) is the cost of producing evidence y, and
the party arguing with facts enjoys an automatic endowment of evidence c−1 (c0) > 0.
Deterrence provided by a fully rewarded plaintiff
Suppose for now that the plaintiﬀ is fully rewarded for victory in court, u(Z) = Z. Under
this speciﬁcation, it is straightforward to verify that for all punishments Z suﬃciently
large, the two parties produce the same amount of evidence in equilibrium — both after
Entrepreneur behaves, and after he diverts. So in either case, the equilibrium probability
that Entrepreneur loses the court case and is punished is Q(0).
The only deterrence eﬀect comes from the diﬀerence in Entrepreneur’s equilibrium ex-
penditures. Again, it is straightforward to show that x∗
EB = x∗
EG + c0: Entrepreneur
spends c0 more on evidence production after he has diverted than after he has behaved.
Given this, for all Z suﬃciently large we can conclude that the deterrence provided in
this case is simply ζ (Z) = c0. Raising Z does not have any eﬀect of deterrence.
33Deterrence provided by an unincentivized plaintiff
From condition (17) it is straightforward to conﬁrm that reducing the plaintiﬀ rewards
will increase the deterrence provided in this case — and so provide a level of deterrence
unachievable by any punishment Z under full plaintiﬀ rewards. In fact, if we move to the
extreme of a completely unincentivized plaintiﬀ, then the deterrence that can be provided
is in fact unbounded.
To see this, start by noting that for all Z large enough Entrepreneur’s equilibrium
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As the penalty Z grows large the resources Entrepreneur devotes to evidence production also
grow without bound, i.e., x∗
EG → ∞ and x∗
EB → ∞ as Z → ∞. Moreover, Entrepreneur
always devotes more to evidence production when he has the disadvantage of arguing against
the facts. To see this, note that if this were not the case then the FOC could not both
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Entrepreneur’s chances of winning the case are higher when he has behaved, i.e. c−1 (x∗
EG + c0) >
c−1 (x∗
EB) − c−1 (c0). To see this, note that if this were not the case then the FOC could
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From the observations immediately above, Entrepreneur’s probability of winning the case
converges to limy→∞ Q(y) regardless of whether he has behaved or diverted. Nonetheless,
we will show that arbitrarily large incentives can be provided by a making Z large enough.
The reason is that provided mild assumptions on the curvature of c( ) and Q( ) are satisﬁed,
34the extra amount that Entrepreneur spends after he has diverted grows without bound as
the punishment Z becomes large, i.e., x∗
EB − x∗
EG → ∞ as Z → ∞.
Lemma 6. (Unbounded deterrence from an unincentivized plaintiﬀ)
Suppose that the marginal cost of evidence production grows without bound (c′ (y) → ∞ as
y → ∞) and that Q′′/Q′ and c′′/c′ are both bounded from above. Moreover, if Q′′/Q′ → 0
then it does so at a slower rate than c′ → ∞. Under these conditions, the deterrence
provided by an unincentivized plaintiﬀ can be made arbitrarily large by making Z arbitrarily
large.17
Out-of-court settlement
If the litigating parties were able to come to an agreement outside court, they would save
their joint inﬂuence expenditures x∗
Ea + x∗
Pa. Empirically, a large majority of lawsuits are
settled out-of-court. How does this possibility aﬀect the analysis?
The court outcomes that the parties expect represent threat points in a bargaining
game. If we make the standard modelling assumption that Entrepreneur receives some
fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of the surplus available — here, the avoided expenditure x∗
Ea + x∗
Pa —
then the deterrence produced by a penalty Z becomes:
ζOCS (Z;u) = V (x∗






First, consider how out-of-court settlement alters the eﬀect of small deviations from the



































Our assumption that the court function π treats the two parties symmetrically implies that




PB) have opposite signs.
17The “passive judge” court deﬁned by equation (8) and with the signal θ distributed logistically satisﬁes





35Absent out-of-court settlement we found that reductions in plaintiﬀ incentives improve
deterrence when the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure responds more after Entrepreneur has behaved,
i.e., ∂x∗
PG/∂u− > ∂x∗
PB/∂u− (see Section 4). From (24), out-of-court settlement reinforces
this conclusion if x′
EG (x∗
PG) < 0; and weakens it if x′
EG (x∗
PG) > 0. By (9), the two cases
correspond to πEP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;G) < 0 and πEP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;B) > 0 respectively. For the latter
case of πEP (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;B) > 0, numerical simulations suggest that in many cases deterrence
is still improved by a reduction in plaintiﬀ incentives when inequality (13) of Proposition 1
fails to hold.
In Section 5 we showed that when condition (SUB) holds, a completely unincentivized
plaintiﬀ generates more deterrence than a fully incentivized plaintiﬀ (see Proposition 2).
The possibility of out-of-court settlement qualiﬁes this result. To see this, observe that





EG. On the other hand, when the plaintiﬀ is unin-
centivized, since condition (SUB) holds Entrepreneur spends more defending himself when
guilty, x∗
EG < x∗
EB; and so settlement reduces deterrence. Again, numerical simulations
suggest that an unincentivized plaintiﬀ still produces greater deterrence in many circum-
stances in which (SUB) holds. Moreover, from Lemma 6 there are speciﬁcations of π
for which an unincentivized plaintiﬀ produces levels of deterrence unachievable by a fully
rewarded plaintiﬀ.
The decision to ﬁle a case
The paper has focused on how the comparison between how Entrepreneur’s expected net
payoﬀ in court is aﬀected by plaintiﬀ incentives after he behaves and diverts. As noted
previously, plaintiﬀ incentives may also aﬀect deterrence by changing the probability that
the plaintiﬀ ﬁles a case at all.
To model this, one could proceed as follows. Let η be an up-front cost paid by the





36Thus if ﬁling costs are drawn from a distribution H, deterrence is










Filing costs that are generally low would have little impact on the paper’s main results.
Higher ﬁling costs would introduce additional eﬀects: in particular, the impact of reducing
plaintiﬀ incentives would now depend both on how Entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ in court
changes, and on how the probability of facing a lawsuit at all changes. The analysis of this
case is left for future research.
7 Discussion
We have established that it is generally desirable to curb plaintiﬀ incentives when courts are
highly susceptible to inﬂuence-activities by a party arguing against the facts. Conversely,
when courts are resistant to inﬂuence activities of this sort, then full plaintiﬀ incentives
are preferable. These ﬁndings have clear implications for when split-award statutes are
desirable.
Below, we discuss some slightly less obvious implications in more detail: the choice be-
tween public and private enforcement, the admissibility of class action lawsuits, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, and the use of “loser-pays” rules.
Public enforcement
As noted in the introduction, plaintiﬀs who are acting on behalf of the state are rewarded
very diﬀerently from private plaintiﬀs. Examples of the former include public prosecutors
(District Attorneys in the U.S.) and employees of state regulatory agencies (the SEC, for
example). Certain categories of judges in many civil law countries also act at times like pub-
lic prosecutors, and fall within this category. In none of these cases does the state employee
acting as a plaintiﬀ receive a direct monetary reward for winning a court case. Instead, if
37he or she is awarded at all it is via future career advancement and/or salary increases. In
many instances these employees are protected by lifetime employment, further reducing the
incentives they face. Additionally, in some civil law systems a public prosecutor’s incentives
may be further reduced by the use of an “examining judge” in a pre-trial stage.18
Given the apparent lack of incentives of public plaintiﬀs, one might ask (as do Becker and
Stigler, 1974) why public enforcement is used at all. The analysis presented here suggests
an answer: it is precisely the lack of incentives that makes public enforcement valuable.
Moreover, the analysis suggests that this advantage arises only in legal systems which work
badly, in the sense of allowing the party arguing against the facts a substantial ability to
inﬂuence the court’s decision.
This has implications for the comparative design of legal systems: if, for example, private
litigation is viewed as providing suﬃcient deterrence against various activities in the U.S.,
this does not imply that it will do so in other countries. Instead, it may be necessary for
the state to play a much more activist role in the enforcement of laws. For example, a
regulatory agency can be endowed with stronger enforcement powers; or actions labeled as
grossly negligent in private tort cases, which in the U.S. often attract punitive damages,
can instead be dealt with in criminal courts.19
Empirically, the paper’s analysis suggests that the welfare eﬀects of many legal features
will be vary widely across jurisdictions. For example, studies such as those of La Porta
et al (2003) and Beck et al (2003) attempt to measure the economic impact of regulatory
agencies. To the extent to which regulatory agencies have lower incentives to win a case
than private plaintiﬀs, the results of this paper suggest that granting enforcement powers to
regulatory agencies will have a positive welfare impact only in jurisdictions in which courts
are highly responsive to the inﬂuence activities of the party arguing against the facts.
Since in practice only laws are publicly enforced, while private contracts are privately
enforced, this comparison also has implications for when laws themselves will be most
18See, e.g., Merryman (1985).
19Merryman (1985) suggests that it is indeed the case that criminal sanctions replace the absence of
punitive damages in many civil law jurisdictions.
38useful.20 That is, while the traditional Coasian view21 stresses the role of ex ante transaction
costs in determining when laws and regulations achieve something private contracts alone
cannot, the analysis here suggests that ex post enforcement costs are also important. As
such, it oﬀers an explanation of why laws matter even in domains such a ﬁnancial markets
where transactions costs are often argued to be low.22 As with the case of public versus
private enforcement, the implication is that laws and regulations are of most value exactly
when courts function somewhat poorly.
Class action lawsuits
In the United States plaintiﬀs with similar claims against a common defendant often combine
their claims into a class action lawsuit. The combination of claims in this manner is
substantially harder in most European legal systems, including even the English legal system
from which much of the U.S. legal system is derived.23
From the perspective of this paper, the key property of class action lawsuits is that they
aﬀect the plaintiﬀ reward to winning a lawsuit, as the following (extremely stylized) model
demonstrates.
There are N plaintiﬀs, each with a claim of Z against a common defendant. Absent
class action suits, one of the plaintiﬀs must litigate ﬁrst. Assume that the success/failure
of this ﬁrst suit inﬂuences courts deciding the case brought by the remaining plaintiﬀs. To
make the analysis as transparent as possible, we focus on the extreme case in which (a) if
the ﬁrst plaintiﬀ wins her case, all the remaining plaintiﬀs will win their cases, while (b) if
the ﬁrst plaintiﬀ loses her case, all the remaining plaintiﬀs will lose their cases. So the ﬁrst
plaintiﬀ gains Z if she wins her case, while the defendant loses the much greater amount
20The paper has nothing to say on why the mode of enforcement is correlated with whether the state or
private parties write the law/contract/regulation that is to be enforced.
21Asides from Coase (1960), see, for example, Posner (1998).
22See, e.g., La Porta et al (1997) for an empirical analysis of the impact of laws governing creditor and
shareholder rights.
23See, e.g., Sherman (2002).
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In contrast, if class action cases are allowed, then the plaintiﬀs can combine their claims.
The combined class of plaintiﬀs gains NZ if they win their case, which is now equal to the
defendant’s loss.
Given the paper’s main results, it follows immediately that class action suits will be
good for deterrence whenever courts are unresponsive to the inﬂuence activities of the
party arguing against the facts, and bad for deterrence when the reverse is true.
Many commentators have voiced concern that class action suits in the U.S. make pos-
sible highly “speculative” lawsuits against corporations, and in doing so impose large costs
without enhancing deterrence.24 Such criticisms are consistent with the analysis of this
paper when courts are responsive to the inﬂuence activities of the party arguing against
the facts. Conversely, in the legal literature Rosenberg (2000) has recently argued that
class action lawsuits improve deterrence be equating the plaintiﬀ’s and defendant’s stakes;
the current paper formally conﬁrms this argument, and makes clear that it depends the
particular assumptions one makes about a court’s responsiveness to inﬂuence attempts by
the litigating parties.
As noted, we have focused on the extreme case in which the ruling in the ﬁrst plaintiﬀ’s
lawsuit sets a binding precedent for all future lawsuits. We would clearly reach the same
qualitative conclusions provided the ﬁrst court’s ruling inﬂuences later courts to a much
weaker extent.
Collateral estoppel
Suppose a court has ruled against a plaintiﬀ in one lawsuit, and that the same plaintiﬀ
subsequently sues a diﬀerent defendant on similar grounds. Can this second defendant
derive any advantage from the ﬁrst court’s ruling against the common plaintiﬀ? In a 1971
24See, e.g., The Economist, March 24 2001, “Tort on stilts”; and the sources cited by Posner in Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F. 3d 1293.
40decision the U.S. Supreme Court extended the common law concept of collateral estoppel25
to cover just such a circumstance, and ruled that the second defendant can indeed beneﬁt
from the plaintiﬀ’s failure in a previous case.26
The possibility of defensive collateral estoppel of this sort clearly serves to increase the
plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ to winning a lawsuit — for if she loses, she is deprived of future litigation
opportunities. As such, defensive collateral estoppel will increase deterrence whenever
courts are unresponsive to expenditures by the party arguing against the facts; and will
decrease deterrence if the reverse if true.
“Loser-pays” rules
In many legal regimes, including those covering most of Europe, the losing party in a
lawsuit pays at least some portion of the winning party’s legal costs.27 This practice is
often referred to the English rule, or indemniﬁcation. In contrast, in the United States
each party is responsible for their own legal costs.
What is the eﬀect of loser-pays rules on deterrence? Suppose, for instance, that the
winning party is able to recover a fraction λ ∈ [0,1] of his/her legal expenditures from
the losing party. Under this modiﬁcation, Entrepreneur’s problem is to choose his legal
expenditure to maximize
−(1 − π (xE,xP;a))Z − (1 − π(xE,xP;a))λ(xE + xP) − (1 − λ)xE
while the plaintiﬀ’s maximization problem is to choose xP to maximize
(1 − π(xE,xP;a))u(Z) − π(xE,xP;a)λ(xE + xP) − (1 − λ)xP
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Pa)) − λπ (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa;a) ≤ (1 − λ) with equality if x∗
Pa > 0
25The same concept is often referred to as issue preclusion.
26See, e.g., Spurr (1991).
27See, e.g., Hause (1989).
41Rather than conduct a full analysis of this new environment, we will instead simply
discuss a case in which a loser-pays rule actually reduces deterrence. Consider the class of
court functions deﬁned by (22) above, with the added condition that if both parties produce
the same amount of evidence then the court will rule for each of them with a probability of
1/2, i.e. Q(0) = 1/2. In an environment of this sort, the equilibrium expenditures when
the plaintiﬀ is fully rewarded satisfy x∗
PG = x∗
EG + c0 and x∗
EB = x∗






In other words, the party arguing with the facts expends an amount c0 less on evidence pro-
duction than does the party arguing against the facts, and the probability that Entrepreneur
wins the case is equal to 1/2 regardless of whether he behaves or diverts.
The key point to note is that the equilibrium of the modiﬁed “loser-pays” game must
satisfy these same properties. It follows that while the deterrence provided in the standard
case is simply ζ (Z) = c0 for all Z large enough, it is ζ (Z) = (1 − λ)c0 when the winning
party can recover a proportion λ of his legal expenditures from the losing party.
Consequently at least in this class of examples, loser-pays rules reduce deterrence.
Common law and civil law
This section has suggested that a relatively heavy reliance on private law, the admissibility
of class action lawsuits, and collateral estoppel all act to increase plaintiﬀ incentives relative
to their opposites. Overall, the paper has emphasized the relation between, on the one
hand, the susceptibility of a court to the inﬂuence activities of the party arguing against
the facts, and on the other, the optimal level of plaintiﬀ incentives. Propositions 1 and
2 characterize in general terms the level of responsiveness of a court to expenditures by
litigating parties that is needed to rationalize restricting plaintiﬀ incentives. Whether
these general properties are satisﬁed by a speciﬁc court system is ultimately an empirical
matter.
That said, it is worth noting that the plaintiﬀ incentive-enhancing features discussed
42above are all present in the U.S. legal system, and are generally absent from civil law
jurisdictions. To the extent to which one believes legal rules are approximately optimal, a
possible interpretation is that U.S. courts are relatively unresponsive to the eﬀorts of the
party against the facts, and that legal rules have evolved to reﬂect this.
Given that civil law judges are usually viewed as playing a more active fact-ﬁnding
role than their more common law counterparts, this interpretation is consistent with the
examples of Section 3. In the second example, which we described as evidence presentation
to an informed judge, constraints on plaintiﬀ incentives are always optimal; while in the
third example, which we described as evidence presentation to a passive judge, full plaintiﬀ
incentives may be optimal.
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A Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
An expenditure pair (x∗
Ea,x∗
Pa) is an equilibrium if and only if x∗
Pa is a ﬁxed point of the
function xPa ◦ xEa, and x∗
Ea = xEa (x∗
Pa). As we have noted, both xEa and xPa are
continuous functions. Moreover, xEa (xP) ∈ [0,Z] and xPa (xE) ∈ [0,Z] for any xP and
xE, since certainly neither party will ever spend more than Z in order to win Z. Brouwer’s
ﬁxed point theorem then implies that the function xPa ◦ xEa must have a ﬁxed point in
45[0,Z]. For uniqueness, note from the characterization of the best response functions (9)
and text immediately following (see page 16) that xPa◦xEa is a weakly decreasing function.
Consequently the ﬁxed point x∗
Pa is unique, and then x∗
Ea is unique given x∗
Pa. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
As in the main text, consider a discrete increase in u(Z) to ˆ u(Z) ≡ u(Z)−ε. Let ˆ xPa (xE)
denote the plaintiﬀ’s reaction function under this new level of u(Z). Clearly the plaintiﬀ’s
new best response is lowered for all Entrepreneur expenditures, i.e., ˆ xPa (xE) ≤ xPa (xE)
for all xE.
First, consider the case in which x∗
Pa = 0. Since xPa (x∗
Ea) = 0 then ˆ xPa (x∗
Ea) = 0. So
the expenditures x∗
Ea and x∗
Pa still constitute an equilibrium under the new plaintiﬀ reward
ˆ u(Z). Thus ∂x∗
Pa/∂u− exists, and equals 0.
Second, consider the case in which x∗
Pa > 0. In this case ˆ xPa (x∗
E) > 0 for ε small
enough, and so ˆ xPa is diﬀerentiable at x∗
Ea. Taking the Taylor expansion of ˆ xPa around
x∗
Ea,
ˆ xPa (xE) = ˆ xPa (x∗









where O(δ) denotes a term that tends to zero at least as fast as δ. So for |xE − x∗
Ea| < ε,






























From (9) it is clear that the slope of the reaction function under ˆ u(Z) (i.e. ˆ x′
Pa (x∗
Ea))
diﬀers from the slope under u(Z) (i.e. x′
Pa (x∗
Ea)) only to the extent that the level of the
reaction function itself is diﬀerent. Since the change in the level of the reaction function
is itself of order ε, the change in the slope must also be of order ε. So substituting in also
x∗
Pa = xPa (x∗
Ea), (25) rewrites to



















xEa (xP) = x∗







(As in the statement of the Lemma, x′
Ea (x∗
Pa) denotes the left-hand side derivative in
the case that xEa is not diﬀerentiable at x∗






















































Ea) ≤ 0. This establishes that the linear approximation (26) is
valid even in the case where xEa is not diﬀerentiable at x∗
Pa, and so completes the proof.
QED
Formal demonstration that in the bribery game example, at equilibrium ¯ θPP + ¯ θEE = 0
Evaluating explicitly,




































































































































































At equilibrium, xE = xP and ¯ θ = 0. Moreover, ¯ θE = −¯ θP. It is then immediate that
¯ θEE + ¯ θPP = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
The plaintiﬀ’s expenditure x∗
PG is such that xPG (xPB (x∗
PG)) = x∗
PG. When (SUB) holds,
xPG (xE) ≥ xPB (xE) for all xE, and xEG (xP) ≤ xEB (xP) for all xP. Take xP ≤ x∗
PG.
So xEG (xP) ≤ xEB (xP). Since πEP (xE,xP;G) > 0 for xE ≥ xEG(xP), this implies that
xPG ( ) must be decreasing over the range [xEG (xP),xEB (xP)]. Thus xPG (xEG (xP)) ≥
xPG (xEB (xP)). (SUB) then implies xPG (xEG (xP)) ≥ xPB (xEB (xP)). As noted in the
proof of Lemma 1, the function xPa ◦ xEa is weakly decreasing. Thus the ﬁxed point of
xPB ◦ xEB must lie to the left of the ﬁxed point of xPG ◦ xEG. That is, x∗
PB ≤ x∗
PG.
The case where (COMP) holds follows a parallel argument. Now, xPG (xE) ≤ xPB (xE)
for all xE, and xEG (xP) ≥ xEB (xP) for all xP. Again, take xP ≤ x∗
PG. So xEG (xP) ≥
xEB (xP). As before, this implies xPG (xEG(xP)) ≤ xPG (xEB (xP)). (COMP) then
implies xPG (xEG(xP)) ≤ xPB (xEB (xP)). Thus the ﬁxed point of xPB ◦ xEB must lie to
the right of the ﬁxed point of xPG ◦ xEG. That is, x∗
PB ≥ x∗
PG. QED
Proof of Lemma 5
Note ﬁrst that in our initial discussion of “passive judge” courts we already showed that
at the equilibrium plaintiﬀ expenditure x∗
PG, Entrepreneur produces more evidence, i.e.,
inequality (18) holds. It remains to deal with the cases xP < x∗
PG. Suppose that con-
trary to the claimed result there exists a level of plaintiﬀ expenditure xP < x∗
PG at which
48Entrepreneur produces less evidence than the plaintiﬀ, yE (xEG (xP);G) < yP (xP;G).
At the evidence diﬀerence yE (xEG(xP);G)−yP (xP;G) the function Q is locally convex,
and so Q′ is increasing. Consider now a slight increase in the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure to
ˆ xP = xP + ε. Since Q is locally convex, then locally πEP < 0 and so Entrepreneur’s
best response function is a decreasing function of the plaintiﬀ’s expenditure xP, and so
xEG (ˆ xP) ≤ xEG(xP). Assume for now that xEG (xP), and so the FOC holds at equality.
So
y′
E (xEG (ˆ xP);G)Q′ (yE (xEG (ˆ xP);G) − yP (ˆ xP;G))
= y′
E (xEG (xP);G)Q′ (yE (xEG (xP);G) − yP (xP;G))
Since xEG (ˆ xP) ≤ xEG(xP) and yE is concave, this implies
Q′ (yE (xEG (ˆ xP);G) − yP (ˆ xP;G)) ≤ Q′ (yE (xEG (xP);G) − yP (xP;G))
Since Q is locally convex, this implies
yE (xEG (ˆ xP);G) − yP (ˆ xP;G) ≤ yE (xEG (xP);G) − yP (xP;G) (31)
For the case in which Entrepreneur’s FOC is not at equality, xEG (xP) = 0. But then
xEG (ˆ xP) = 0 also, and so trivially inequality (31) holds.
We have shown that if a plaintiﬀ expenditure of xP results in the plaintiﬀ producing
more evidence than Entrepreneur, the same must be true at all higher levels of plaintiﬀ
expenditure. This contradicts inequality (18), completing the proof. QED
Property (SUB): an example
One example of a case in which property (SUB) holds is the evidence production deﬁned
by (8), with γF = γT = β, Q(y) = eβy/
 
1 + eβy 
, and βγ < 1 (which ensures concavity of




































































































































































To complete the proof, it is suﬃcient to show that expression (33) is negative. If XEF ≥

































< 2βγ − 2βγ = 0.
This completes the proof.
50Proof of Lemma 6
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   (35)
Suppose that contrary the claimed result, there exists some ∆ such that x∗
EB−(x∗
EG + c0) ≤
∆ for all Z, no matter how large. Observe that x∗
EB,x∗
EG → ∞ as Z → ∞.











and so the right-hand side of equation (35) is bounded above by assumption.





EB) − c−1 (x∗




c′ (c−1 (ˇ y))
.
Consequently, as Z → ∞, the gap between the evidence actually produced in the two states
must approach 0, i.e., c−1 (x∗
EB) − c−1 (x∗
EG + c0) → 0. Since ˆ y ≤ c−1 (x∗
EG + c0),
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CASE: Q′′/Q′ is bounded away from 0. It is immediate that the left-hand of (35) is
unbounded. This gives the required contradiction and completes the proof.




   








   
   









52Since c′  
c−1 (ˇ y)
 




≥ c′ (ˆ y), expression (36) is in turn less than
− lim
Z→∞
   Q′′ (ˆ y)/Q′ (ˆ y)
   c′ (ˇ y)c−1 (c0)/∆.
But by assumption this is −∞, giving a contradiction and completing the proof. QED
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